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A global trend towards decentralisation, particularly in emerging and transitional 
economies, is well underway. At the same time, there are many different meanings as-
signed to the concept, and it is frequently left undefined, even while it is being imple-
mented. Written under the auspices of the University of Technology Sydney, Centre 
for Local Government, this paper argues that enhanced understanding of concepts 
and theories can contribute to improved practice during decentralisation reforms, 
and consequently be of benefit to governments and to their citizens.  Drawing on the 
theoretical, research and policy literature, an approach is adopted that aims to draw 
benefits from this literature for public policy and administration in particularly the 
emerging and transitional economies. The material in the paper is used as a founda-
tion for putting forward a recommended synthesis-framework for decentralisation 
implementation that draws attention to: appreciating the theoretical scope of fiscal 
decentralisation; focusing on the country and its goals; considering the design of the 
system of multi-level governance; focusing on central and local capacity; and adopt-
ing flexibility, supported by feedback mechanisms, in the process of decentralisation.
The Centre for Local Government based at the University of Technology, Sydney is 
the leading university-based centre in Australia delivering an extensive program of 
local governance research, teaching and specialist national and international consult-
ing services. The centre’s activities are directed towards improving the capacity of 
governments at all levels to deliver quality services, good governance, strong lead-
ership, public value and improved democracy. UTS:CLG has formal links with key 
international organizations to enable collaborative and country based development 
and delivery of capacity building programs.
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Conceptualising decentralisation and subsidiarity
Even a cursory examination of the world’s states reveals a dizzy-
ing array of relationships between central and subnational gov-
ernments…This already diverse mixture of systems has been fur-
ther enriched by a recent global trend toward decentralization, 
most strikingly in the developing world.
(Hankla 2009: 632)
Decentralisation
There is strong evidence in the literature that many different 
meanings have been assigned to the concept of ‘decentralisation’, and 
also that it is frequently left undefined (Sharma 2006: 54; Kim 2008: 
4-7; Dubois and Fattore 2009: 706-707). Part of the difficulty lies in 
the fact that the concept is used by scholars from different disciplines – 
amongst others Public Administration, Political Science and Economics 
– and that there is ‘too little interaction between their respective bodies 
of work‘ (Hutchcroft, cited in Pina-Sanchez 2014: 12). Many, but by no 
means all, authors refer to ‘decentralisation’ as ‘fiscal decentralisation’ 
when they are debating the issues discussed in this paper. This is possibly 
to distinguish the concept from discourse in which it is used not to theo-
rise governance but to consider the distribution of population in a given 
territory. The focus here is on the balance of population in the ‘centre’ 
and the ‘periphery’, and particularly on the dispersal of people from the 
centre. This has been an important issue in Australia. As Borrie (cited in 
Productivity Commission 2011: 137) notes, ‘concerns about the distri-
bution of the Australian population and the ‘balance’ between the urban 
and rural areas go back to the early years of federation’. Although strong 
arguments can be made that the level of decentralisation of a population 
is a key factor in shaping governance of that population, this aspect of 
the concept will not be explored in this paper.
Based on analysis of more than 40 definitions of decentralisation 
in the literature, Dubois and Fattore (2009: 707-711) conclude that the 
concept refers to both a structure and a process; that it focuses on ques-
tions of authority, responsibility and power, as well as functions and 
resources; and that it draws attention to the transferring entity (cen-
tral government) and the receiving entities (sub-national government). 
These authors point out that existing definitions generally neglect to 
include ‘silent’ or ‘unintended’ decentralisation, which they refer to as 
the situation in which decentralisation, or indeed centralisation, is not 
pursued as an active reform (Dubois and Fattore 2009: 717).
Many countries have begun to undertake decentralisation as a 
response to ‘government failure’ and as a means to make government 
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more efficient, responsive and accountable (Kim 2008: 8). Decentralisa-
tion is particularly favoured by theorists who favour small government 
and free markets, and who regard privatization as a key means of con-
tributing to the decentralisation of the public sector (Kim 2008: 8). The 
argument is frequently made that if government can perform closer to 
the people it is meant to serve, the people will get more out of it and 
be more willing to accept government authority (White 2011: 1). A jus-
tification for decentralisation is therefore to enhance the legitimacy of 
government power, which is one of the defining features of good gover-
nance (see Stoker 1998). 
By better matching the preferences of individual citizens and in-
creasing their individual welfare, there may be flow-on effects for eco-
nomic growth through impacts on work effort, savings and private in-
vestment. Decentralisation may additionally enhance economic growth 
through providing sub-national officials with the ability to actively pur-
sue economic development policies, thereby contributing to the balanced 
distribution of resources across regions – a feature of macroeconomic 
stability (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003). Other authors point out 
that decentralisation may serve to deter people from migrating into the 
‘shadow economy’ by reducing the distance between bureaucrats and 
economic agents. It can serve to increase the probability of detection, 
and therefore,’ lowers the expected net gains from activities in the shad-
ow economy’ (Buehn, Lessmann and Markwardt 2013: 2569).
Dimensions of decentralisation 
Fiscal 
Fiscal decentralisation, according to several conceptions in the lit-
erature:
•	 represents the ‘transfer of competencies, responsibilities and 
financial resources from the central (state) level to the lower 
levels of government’ (Finzgar and Oplotnik 2013: 654); 
•	 can be said to exist when sub-national governments have the 
decision-making power to raise revenues and perform spending 
activities (Kim 2008: 7);
•	 refers to the ‘proportion of fiscal impact’ at levels other than the 
central government (Schneider 2006: 348); and
•	 is the ‘pillar of public administration decentralisation’ (Halasko-
va and Halaskova 2014: 625). 
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Measurement of fiscal decentralisation includes expenditures 
of lower levels of government as a percentage of total expenditures or 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP); revenues of lower tiers of government 
as a percentage of total revenues or GDP; division of tax revenues be-
tween central and local governments; and the level and extent of tax 
authority and share of expenditures in selected public sector areas – such 
as education, health, social security – as a share of total expenditures of 
lower levels of government (Halaskova and Halaskova 2014: 627).
Administrative 
Administrative decentralisation focuses on granting the respon-
sibility for planning, financing and ordering of specific public functions 
to sub-central governments, in short, ‘granting local jurisdictions au-
tonomy from central control’ (Schneider 2006: 348). Higher levels of 
administrative decentralisation suggest that there is a greater level of 
independent decision-making by sub-national governments and can oc-
cur even if most taxes are raised by central government (Halaskova and 
Halaskova 2014: 625). Dennis Rondinelli (see Rondinelli and Nellis 
1986: 6-10; Rondinelli, McCollough and Johnson 1989) has provided 
a contribution to the debates which suggests that there are three major 
types of administrative decentralisation, and this framework has been 
used by several authors (see e.g. Chattopadhyay 2013: 423; Rees and 
Hossain 2010: 583; Schneider 2006).
Deconcentration refers to a central government dispersing re-
sponsibility for a policy to its field offices or regional branch offices 
(Schneider 2006: 349; Chattopadhyay 2013: 423). Put differently, it im-
plies the ‘shifting of workload from centrally located officials to staff or 
offices outside the national capital’ (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986: 6). This 
transfer changes the spatial and geographic distribution of authority, but 
ensures that the central government retains authority over the field of-
fice and exercises that authority through the hierarchical channels of 
central government bureaucracy (Schneider 2006: 349).
With a focus on the transfer of managerial responsibility, delega-
tion implies that local governments or agencies carry out certain func-
tions on behalf of the centre (Chattopadhyay 2013: 423). Ultimate re-
sponsibility is nevertheless retained by the central authority (Rees and 
Hossain 2010: 583). Under delegation, the central government has to 
exercise its control through an arm’s length contractual relationship that 
‘enforces accountability on the part of local government’ (Schneider 
2006: 349).
Devolution implies ‘the creation or strengthening, financially or 
legally, of sub-national units of government, whose activities are sub-
stantially outside the direct control of the central government’ (Rondi-
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nelli and Nellis 1986: 8). Both the implementation and the authority to 
decide what is done is shifted to local bodies, who are accountable to 
the central government in so far as it is able to ‘impose its will by threat-
ening to withhold resources or responsibility that the local unit needs’ 
(Schneider 2006: 349). Devolution is regarded in most of the literature 
as ‘the purest or at least the most extensive form of decentralization’ 
(White 2011: 2).
Schneider (2006: 348-349) suggests that viewing these three as-
pects of administrative decentralisation in categorical terms has been 
superseded in later debate by viewing them along a continuum of ad-
ministrative autonomy, presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Administrative autonomy continuum
Source: based on Schneider (2006: 348-349)
Political
Political decentralisation focuses on ways in which political ac-
tivities in a territorial state are conducted at the local as opposed to the 
national level. A decentralised political system is one in which ‘political 
actors and issues are significant at the local level and at least partially 
independent from those at the national level’ (Fox and Aranda, cited in 
Schneider 2006: 349-350).
Political justification of decentralisation formalises a ‘causal chain 
of devolution leading to more active citizen involvement and voice in 
the formulation and implementation of public policies’ (Chattopadhyay 
2013: 426). Accountability plays a key role in this, since it is presumed 
that a strongly decentralised system can make governments more respon-
sive in terms of the speed and quality of their responses to the citizenry, 
as well as having an impact on the quantity of response. Sustainability 
of the system comes into play, since a heightened sense of accountability 
infuses ‘greater sense of ownership among the citizenry and therefore 
make the projects more sustainable’ (Chattopadhyay 2013: 426). 
According to Prud’homme (2002: 4-5), the ‘political efficiency’ 
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which results from decentralisation policies relates to issues such as local 
participation in political decision-making, local governments being an 
effective training ground for politicians, and decentred power provid-
ing an additional protection against authoritarianism from the centre 
(Prud’homme 2002: 6). Ideally, under highly politically decentralised 
systems, ‘citizens define interests and form identities on the basis of local 
concerns, and organisations such as parties and social movements oper-
ate locally and compete over local issues and in local elections’ (Schnei-
der 2006: 350).
Market
Market decentralisation refers to issues relating to deregula-
tion and privatisation, and thus moves beyond government to the in-
volvement of the non-government (and particularly the private) sector 
(Halaskova and Halaskova 2014: 625). Under privatisation or deregu-
lation, governments divest themselves of their functional responsibilities 
‘either by transferring them to voluntary organisations, or by allowing 
them to be performed by private enterprises’ (Rondinelli and Nellis 
1986: 8). While not included in all texts as a dimension of decentrali-
sation, there are strong arguments for suggesting that its importance is 
increasing in the age of ‘governance’. 
The changing social and economic environment of recent de-
cades, linked to factors such as globalisation and demographic shifts, has 
contributed to vigorous debate and action on new forms of governance 
(Treib, Bahr and Faulkner 2007). In the political dimension, governance 
is a decision-making system that generally involves state actors sharing 
power with private actors within inter-organisational networks (Treib 
et al 2007: 3). This means that government in the context of gover-
nance has to learn an appropriate operating code which challenges past 
hierarchical modes of thinking (Stoker 1998: 24). As described by Orr 
and Vince (2009), this approach regards power as inevitably dispersed 
and emphasises the significance of networks rather than hierarchies and 
bureaucracies. 
The task of government in governance is not merely to rely on 
its power to command or to use its authority, but rather to engage in a 
new governing style that includes making use of the following methods:
•	 Composition and coordination – defining a situation, identify-
ing key stakeholders and developing effective linkages between 
the relevant parties.
•	 Steering – influencing and steering relationships in order to 
achieve desired outcomes.
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•	 Integration and regulation – thinking and acting beyond the in-
dividual sub-systems, avoiding unwanted side effects and estab-
lishing mechanisms for effective coordination.
(Stoker 1998: 24) 
Decision-making and implementation processes may be distin-
guished according to the degree to which they are formally institution-
alised in terms of who is involved, how decisions may be reached, how 
they have to be implemented, and who is in charge of monitoring com-
pliance (Treib et al 2007: 3). These all suggest a portfolio of governmen-
tal decision-making that is inextricably interconnected with the other 
dimensions of decentralisation discussed earlier.
The principle of subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity has its roots in ‘the social doctrine 
of the Catholic church’ (Ranjault 1992: 49). Put forward by Pope Pius 
XI in his 1931 Quadragesimo anno, it was cast as ‘a fundamental tenet 
of Catholic social teaching’ and created to describe an approach to the 
problems of modern society that reflected ‘a broad understanding of 
human nature, government, and social structures’ (Vischer 2001: 108-
109). 
The principle embodied a notion that the health of a society is in 
great part a function of the ‘vibrancy and empowerment of individuals 
acting together through social groupings and associations’ and it conse-
quently promotes a tendency toward solving problems at the local level 
and on fostering the ‘vitality of mediating structures in society’ (Vischer 
2001: 109-116). The doctrine was explicitly anti-Communist and was 
put forward as an alternative to principles of ‘solidarity’ and ‘collectiv-
ism’ (Vischer 2001: 110). 
The principle of subsidiarity has been widely adopted in Europe 
and beyond. In political debates in the USA it has been regarded, espe-
cially by more conservative commentators, as representing ‘an aspect of 
the original theory of American federalism which held that state gov-
ernments will be more responsive than the national government to the 
public will [and] better informed about local circumstances’ (Huffman, 
cited in Vischer 2001: 123).
In the past few decades, the principle has become incorporated 
into the political, economic and public administration understandings 
of decentralisation. Kim (2008: 11) fuses the normative principle with 
existing decentralisation theory and synthesises this as federalism: 
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The subsidiarity principle and decentralization in federalism 
should produce the optimal allocation of resources and conse-
quently maximize welfare. 
In the Australian context, Fenna and Hollander (2013: 221) sim-
ilarly see the fusion of the two as granting federalism a stronger values 
or normative base:
Subsidiarity is a normative concept, one expressing the view that 
governance arrangements ought to be organised in as thoroughly 
devolved a manner as possible. This is the principle that under-
lies the principle of federalism and it is justified on the basis of 
values that federalism helps preserve or benefits it can deliver.
Taking the historical and current context into consideration, 
Vischer (2001: 128-142) suggests the following as issues to consider 
when focusing on subsidiary as a principle of governance, here briefly 
summarised:
•	 Application of the principle is closely associated with particular 
areas of law, such as constitutional law.
•	 Consideration of the principle draws attention to (central) gov-
ernment, the individual, and the mediating structures which are 
bulwarks against government authority. Subsidiarity calls both 
for the recognition of mediating structures and for their em-
powerment.
•	 Subsidiarity places greater value on mediating structures than 
it does on megastructures, but this implies that any policy that 
purports to apply the principle needs to draw a meaningful dis-
tinction between the two. The role of corporations is particu-
larly salient here, since they may function as megastructures as 
they increase in size and power.
•	 Subsidiarity mandates the localisation of societal problem-solv-
ing, including the obligation to ensure that individuals are 
equipped to participate fully in collective decision-making re-
garding issues that affect them and their communities.
Notwithstanding the fact that the subsidiarity principle only en-
tered the discourse long after federations were in place, Ranjault (1992: 
50) asserts that ‘the concept of subsidiarity is essential to a definition of 
federalism and of any decentralized political organization’. His reason-
ing is that it presupposes an organised society consisting of hierarchical 
or concentric groupings, and the establishment of ‘a necessarily dynamic 
equilibrium between liberty and authority, or between autonomy and 
equity’ for each of these groups (Rajnault 1992: 50). Connections can 
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also be made to the philosophical issues raised by de Tocqueville more 
than a century earlier. 
When applied to a supranational political organisation, in partic-
ular the European Union (EU), and the relationship between the EU (the 
centre) and its constituent parts, the principle increased in importance 
and utility. The EU looked toward subsidiarity as an organising principle 
from the mid-1970s, and it was incorporated into the 1992 Treaty of 
Maastricht as a guideline for further European integration. Within the 
Maastricht Treaty, the principle is expressed as follows:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the mem-
ber-States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
(Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1992, Article 3b, 63, 
cited in Vischer 2001: 121)
At a conceptual level, a key aspect of synergy between decentral-
isation and subsidiarity relates to the advantages that local government, 
or the constituent parts of a supranational organisation, have with re-
gard to the allocative function i.e. the quest for allocative efficiency. The 
principle argues that taxing, spending and regulatory functions should 
be exercised by lower levels of government ‘unless a convincing case can 
be made for assigning them to higher levels of government’ (Kim 2008: 
11). 
In making this ‘convincing case’, subsidiarity draws attention to 
the condition of comparative efficiency. If the central government is to 
hold on to given functions, it needs to justify these decisions on the basis 
that it would ‘secure the desired outcomes better than the sub-units’ 
(Follesdal 1998: 193). The onus would be placed on central govern-
ment to provide the grounds for its justifications to hold on to power. 
It could do so by drawing on the condition of effectiveness (differential 
ability, willingness), the condition of necessity and/or that proscriptive 
or prescriptive conditions apply. In the EU, for example, the principle 
regulates how the central unit is to act so as to respect sub-unit auton-
omy, known as the Minimal Intervention Condition. The EU employs 
directives which stipulate results, while leaving choice of means to mem-
ber states (Follesdal 1998: 193-195)
Writing in particular of the situation in the USA, Vischer (2001: 
142) notes the ‘partisan baggage’ that may be associated with the re-
al-world application of the principle of subsidiarity, but suggests that 
it offers a model that it ‘rooted in a social justice tradition that stresses 
both individual liberty and communitarian values’. 
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Underlying theoretical precepts of decentralisation
Support for decentralisation in the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville
The writings of Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in Ameri-
ca and The Old Regime and the Revolution explore, amongst others, 
perspectives on the relationship between equality and centralisation in 
nations (Pittz 2011: 797).  In his work, he argues that centralisation 
had led to greater equality in France, and was therefore a major cause 
of the French Revolution; but also that democratic ideas and passions 
for equality would lead Americans to concentrate (centralise) power. De 
Tocqueville’s overriding concern was with ‘liberty’ and ‘decentraliza-
tion’ and the suggestion from his writing is that ‘to keep administrative 
power decentralized – or at least slow its momentum towards central-
ization – the moral force of equality must be combated by a love of 
liberty’ (Pittz 2011: 806). De Tocqueville’s works have been Influential 
in debates on democracy since their publication, and the debate he has 
engendered has included considerations of the relationship between the 
centre and the local, and the impacts of this relationship on liberty and 
on equality. 
Decentralisation of power and ‘localism’
The effective representation of locality in national politics, which 
can be described as ‘political localism’, is well recognised as a justifica-
tion for local government in many countries – it matters to people where 
they live and work. This raises questions about the relations between 
the central and the local, which includes consideration of the devolution 
and decentralisation of power. Debates on ‘localism’, which have been 
in the public discourse since the early 1800s, focus inter alia on the rela-
tive power of the local vis-à-vis the central and on central-local relations 
(Powell 2004). 
In 1861, John Stuart Mill had argued that ‘the very object of hav-
ing local representation is in order that those who have any interest in 
common, which they do not share with the general body of their coun-
trymen, may manage that joint interest by themselves’ (cited in Watt 
2006: 8). Mill accepted that administrative decentralisation was essen-
tial for efficient government, but also argued that local government pro-
moted stability for the national liberal democratic system, which could 
not allow every citizen to seriously expect to influence national policy 
(Chandler 2010: 6-7). He maintained that local institutions of democra-
cy are the most accessible locations for political skills to be acquired and 
practised, and that local democracy not only provided greater oppor-
tunities for political participation but also that it was an instrument of 
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social inclusion (Watt 2006: 11; Pratchett 2004: 360; Chandler 2010: 
6-7). 
Arguments for the decentralisation of power were put forward 
even more forcefully by activists such as Joshua Toulmin Smith, the ma-
jor theorist behind the Anti-Centralization Union, who argued in the 
mid-1800s that that those elected to national eminence are too far re-
moved from local understanding and sympathy with any specific com-
munity to make effective decisions for a community. At this time, enthu-
siasm for decentralisation in the United States gained currency among 
liberals in Britain through the writings of de Tocqueville (discussed earli-
er) and were themselves reflected in a European tradition sustained from 
the works of Rousseau and others (Chandler 2010: 8).
More recent justifications for local government include that the 
institutions of local democracy provide for a diffusion of power within 
society and that local democracy supports diversity and difference in 
the face of an otherwise constrictively uniform set of central policies. 
Arguments in favour of local responsiveness also come into play (Pratch-
ett 2004: 359-360). In short, local government can be regarded as the 
‘institutional embodiment of local democracy’ (Pratchett 2004: 359).
The Tiebout model
In 1956, Charles Tiebout described a model of mobile house-
holds that select a community of residence based on their preferences 
for local public goods – people effectively sort themselves into groups 
that are homogenous in their demands for local services (Oates 2005: 
354). 
In putting forward this model, it is argued that ‘Tiebout launched 
the modern study of decentralisation’ (Hankla and Downs 2010: 762) 
since he had defined a situation in which ‘public goods and services are 
provided primarily through the revealed preferences of individuals by 
market mechanisms’ (Rondinelli et al 1989: 59). Since taxpayers are 
mobile, and can migrate or sort themselves among the jurisdictions that 
best match their preferred tax-expenditure package, promotion of indi-
vidual choice results in a ‘Pareto-efficient outcome’ (Oates 2005: 354). 
The Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto had suggested in 
1906 that the individual is the best judge of their own welfare and that 
any change that makes at least one person better off, without making 
anyone worse off, is an ‘improvement’. When all possible Pareto im-
provements have been made, the economy is said to be at a ‘Pareto 
optimum’ (Watt 2006: 6). If an economy is perfectly competitive, equi-
librium or ‘Pareto-efficiency’ exists, and while this has implications for 
individual welfare, it does not address the broader and socially desirable 
objective of equity (Kim 2008: 9).
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The Tiebout model supports the decentralisation process by 
bringing to the public sector some of the allocative benefits that a com-
petitive market brings to the private sector and hence ‘produces a mar-
ket-like solution to the local service provision problem’ (Chattopadhyay 
2013: 425). Recognising the mobility of tax-payers, it provides grounds 
for arguing that ‘the level of welfare achieved through a uniform pro-
vision of public goods by a central government is inferior to that which 
can be attained by a decentralized provision’ (Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2003: 1599). 
Fiscal federalism
The mainline or ‘first-generation’ theory of fiscal federalism ‘lays 
out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to 
different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for 
carrying out these functions’ (Oates 1999: 1121). In fiscal federalism 
theory, ‘pure’ decentralisation as an ideal-type construct would refer to 
‘a system in which pure local governments raise pure local taxes and 
undertake pure local expenditures without the benefit of central govern-
ment transfers’ (Prud’homme 2005: 201).
As it was conceived, fiscal federalism was embedded in the view 
of public finance that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s (Oates 2005: 
350). Wallace E. Oates himself was influential in bringing about the 
theoretical synthesis, based on numerous publications, including Fiscal 
Federalism (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York), published in 1972. 
The theory drew strongly on the works of Richard Musgrave, who put 
forward an active and positive role for the government sector in correct-
ing various forms of market failure in a basically Keynesian framework; 
Kenneth Arrow, who conceptualised the roles of the private and public 
sectors; and Paul Samuelson, who described the nature of public goods 
(Oates 2005: 350). 
Richard Musgrave wrote The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in 
Public Economy (McGraw-Hill, New York) in 1959. This text acknowl-
edges that there are situations in which the private market system fails 
due to various public goods problems, and that the government should 
step in and introduce appropriate policy measures to correct the fail-
ures. It lays out a framework for the assignment of functions to different 
levels of government and discusses the fiscal instruments that are appro-
priate for carrying out these functions (Oates 1999: 1121). The func-
tional categories Musgrave defined at the fiscal level are ‘stabilisation’, 
‘allocation’ and ‘redistribution’.  Fiscal federalism is often measured in 
terms of the role of sub-national units in these key fiscal policy areas of 
stabilisation, allocation and redistribution (Schneider 2006: 348).
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Fiscal federalism perceives governments at different levels pro-
viding efficient levels of output of those public goods whose spatial pat-
terns of benefits are encompassed by the geographical scope of their ju-
risdictions. The tendency is to regard central government as having basic 
responsibility for the macroeconomic stabilisation function through its 
fiscal and monetary policies, and based on the fundamental constraints 
that lower levels of government would have in doing so (Oates 1999: 
1121). Central government is also best placed to deal with income re-
distribution, since local attempts to address income disparities are likely 
to induce inefficient migration, that is, to encourage individuals from 
disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds who are eligible for benefits 
to migrate into the locality and wealthy residents to move out (Chatto-
padhyay 2013: 424). 
Within this model, therefore, central government would take the 
lead in macroeconomic stabilisation policy, introduce basic measures for 
income redistribution, and provide efficient levels of output of national 
public goods (Oates 2005: 352). On the other hand, local governments 
would be in the best position to undertake the allocative function, since 
they have greater information regarding people’s preferences. There is 
a presumption in favour of the decentralised provision of public goods 
with localised effects (Oates 1999: 1122). Put differently, ‘the main 
economic argument for decentralisation is largely based on allocative 
efficiency grounds’ (Chattopadhyay 2013: 424). A deeper discussion of 
‘efficient government’ is provided in section 1.3.6 of this paper.
The model also devoted attention to taxation in a federal system. 
Fiscal federalism theory contends that
[E]conomic efficiency is enhanced and the quality of service de-
livery therefore improved when citizens pay for the cost of public 
services they consume…[S]ervice providers are better able to dis-
cern demand for and adjust supply of local public services when 
consumers can indicate their preferences by directly paying for 
services.
(Lewis 2010: 651)
This perspective suggests that local governments should place 
primary reliance on benefit taxes such as property taxes and user fees, 
while the central government has greater scope for the use of progres-
sive income taxes as part of a ‘broader program for the redistribution 
of income’ (Oates 2005: 352). There is also room for lump-sum grants 
from the central government to sub-national units, justified on equity 
and efficiency grounds. These grants serve to correct distorted migration 
patterns and provide desired assistance to poorer jurisdictions (Hankla 
2009).
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Growing in importance since the 1990s, ‘second-generation’ fis-
cal federalism incorporates a theoretical focus upon:
•	 the trade-offs between centralisation and decentralisation with 
regard to issues such as accountability, fiscal autonomy and co-
ordination of policies; 
•	 local governments turning to the central government for fiscal 
relief; 
•	 the role of central government in performing an insurance func-
tion in the intergovernmental fiscal system; and
•	 what occurs when there is disintegration of the federal system, 
whether through explicit disintegration of the nation state or 
undermining of the workings of a federal government.
(Oates 2005: 357-367)
In short, theorising has shifted to considerations also of the evo-
lution of federal structures and the stability of institutions – ‘a successful 
system of fiscal federalism must be able to sustain itself over time’ (Oates 
2005: 368).
The Leviathan hypothesis
According to Oates (2005: 355), the mainline view of fiscal feder-
alism has been influenced by public choice perspectives, grounded in the 
view that ‘public decision-makers are utility maximizers with their own 
objective functions’. This perspective focuses on issues in government 
such as budget maximisation, enhancement of power and influence, a 
large and growing workforce, and higher salaries, all of which suggest a 
critical view of the institution of government. 
The perspective has gained impetus since the 1980s with the 
‘Leviathan hypothesis’ of Brennan and Buchanan (cited in Oates 2005: 
355), within which fiscal decentralisation was seen as ‘a mechanism for 
constraining the expansionary tendencies of government’. Competition 
among decentralised governments was viewed positively as being able to 
place a limit on the capacities of a monopolistic central government.  In 
many respects, the Leviathan hypothesis extends the Tiebout model (dis-
cussed above) and suggests that, ‘other things being equal, the overall 
size of the public sector should be inversely related to the level of fiscal 
decentralisation’ (Bodman et al 2009: 9).
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Efficient government and the optimal level of decentralisation
More efficient government is an underlying justification for fis-
cal decentralisation (Oates 2005; Kim 2008; Prud’homme 2005). The 
presumption is that the tailoring of goods and services to the particu-
lar preferences and circumstances of localised constituencies leads to an 
increase in economic welfare ‘above that which results from the more 
uniform levels of such services that are likely under national provision’ 
(Oates 1999: 1121-1122). Put differently, the same amount of funds 
spent at the sub-national level rather than at the national level can result 
in increased individual welfare (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003: 
1603). In Fiscal Federalism, Wallace E. Oates had described the theory 
of the ‘optimal level of decentralization’. This suggests that there is a 
trade-off between the responsiveness of central government to sub-na-
tional preferences and its ability to internalize externalities and achieve 
economies of scale (Hankla 2009: 633-634). When sub-national gov-
ernments enjoy significant fiscal autonomy, the result is a diversity of 
taxation and spending policies which serves to enhance the efficiency 
and responsiveness of government in the aggregate. The key is to estab-
lish, in every situation, an ‘efficient level of decentralization where the 
benefits of policy diversity are balanced by the drawbacks of non-inter-
nalization’ (Hankla 2009: 634).
The literature views efficiency from at least two perspectives:
•	 Productive efficiency follows ‘when the economy is working on 
its ‘production possibility frontier: this is when production of 
one good is archived at the lowest cost possible, given the pro-
duction of the other good(s)’ (Kim 2008: 8). If more output is 
produced with a given set of inputs, then productive efficiency 
will be increased (Prud’homme 2002: 5). Productive efficiency 
would be undermined when cost-saving technologies and poli-
cies are not adopted (Kim 2008: 18).
•	 Allocative efficiency refers to a market situation in which the 
limited resources of a country are allocated in accordance with 
the wishes of consumers producing an optimal mix of commod-
ities. ‘Resources are used allocatively efficiently if they are spent 
for producing the right mix of goods for the right people at the 
right price’ (Kim 2008: 8-9).
Since a decentralised system can be more responsive to ’differ-
ences in demands among taxpayers and to their basic needs’ (Marti-
nez-Vazquez and McNab 2003: 1603), decentralisation should have 
a positive effect on allocative efficiency. The argument goes that the 
efficient level of output of a local public good is likely to vary across 
jurisdictions as a result of differences in both preferences and costs and 
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thus, in order to maximise overall social welfare, local outputs should 
be varied accordingly. This is also described as the decentralization the-
orem: ‘local governments are in a better position to more efficiently 
provide public goods because they possess knowledge of the local costs 
and benefits’ (Oates, cited in Goel and Saunoris 2014: 4). 
Kim (2008: 9) writes that, in the context of decentralisation, a 
Pareto efficient allocation of resources alone may not necessarily lead 
to the optimal allocation of resources to meet the collective interest of 
citizens in a particular jurisdiction. Instead, and drawing on the work 
of both Musgrave and Oates, this author suggests that the ideal would 
be ‘perfect correspondence’ in the provision of public goods – a perfect 
match would exist between the jurisdiction of each government unit and 
the groups that collectively consume the goods (Kim 2008: 10). Each 
level of government would be responsible for activities based on four 
criteria:
•	 Economies of scale – for example, the unit cost per good drops 
as the quantity of the good increases. 
•	 The presence of externalities – provision of a good or service 
may have spillover effects beyond a particular jurisdiction. 
When externalities are expected to be greater, provision by gov-
ernment at a higher level would be more desirable.
•	 Heterogeneity of preferences and of circumstances – welfare 
would be maximised if each local government provides a par-
ticular good or service tailored to citizens’ preferences instead 
of uniform centralised provision across the country.
•	 Emulation – competition facilitates the introduction of best 
practices, but requires that at least two jurisdictions are involved 
in any given activity, which is another argument in favour of the 
decentralisation of government activities.
(Kim 2008: 11-12)
There is less support for the proposition that fiscal decentralisa-
tion can contribute to productive efficiency. In particular, there are ques-
tions as to whether local governments operate on the same production 
frontier as the central government and whether issues relating to pro-
ductive efficiency are different in developing and transitional economies 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003: 1604).
Dangers of decentralisation
Several commentators (see e.g. White 2013; Sharma 2006; Hank-
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la 2009) discuss the pitfalls and unintended negative consequences of 
decentralisation. In this section, the work of Remy Prud’homme, profes-
sor of economics at the University of Paris XII, who has been influential 
in the decentralisation debate including in his role with the World Bank, 
will be used to frame issues relating to, as he describes it, the ‘dangers of 
decentralisation’ (Prud’homme 2005).
Increasing disparities and inequality
The conclusion reached by Prud’homme (2005: 202-203) on the 
basis of his analysis of the economic and public finance literature is that 
attempts by local governments to redress income disparities are likely to 
be unfair – socio-economically disadvantaged people in well-off regions 
will fare better than those in more deprived regions. Furthermore, at-
tempts at decentralised redistribution would be self-defeating, because if 
jurisdictions adopt policies to redistribute income, wealthier people are 
likely to leave for more lightly taxed areas and those with fewer resourc-
es will move in to take advantage of the benefits, hence compounding 
the area-based disparities. This draws on the Tiebout model of mobile 
capital (discussed earlier).
According to Prud’homme (2005: 202), concerns that decentral-
isation may lead to increased inequality lend support for the view that 
‘central government must have the responsibility for redistributive pro-
grams and thus must control a large share of taxes and public expendi-
tures.’
Macroeconomic instability
There is a danger that under fiscal decentralisation the fiscal poli-
cies of subnational governments will run counter to those of the central 
government. There are many examples in recent decades – Argentina, 
the United Kingdom in the early 1980s, Brazil and the former Yugoslavia 
– where the ‘fiscal perversity’ of subnational governments led to destabi-
lisation of macroeconomic management (Prud’homme 2005: 206-207). 
Sub-national governments may engage in profligate spending, thus un-
dermining the macroeconomic environment of countries, and there is 
some empirical evidence that decentralised systems can be linked with 
higher inflation (Hankla 2009: 637).
A key macroeconomic policy instrument is fiscal policy, that is, 
control over the amount and structure of taxes and expenditures and the 
management of the budget deficit or surplus. This is ‘an instrument that 
only the central government can manipulate, because local authorities 
have few or no incentives to undertake economic stabilization policies’ 
(Prud’homme 2005: 205). 
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Decentralisation can undermine efficiency
Prud’homme (2005: 207-208) questions whether, particularly 
when applied to developing countries, decentralised provision makes it 
possible to give residents with different tastes in different localities what 
they want to better match demand, and therefore increases welfare. He 
argues that developing countries do not meet most of the explicit or im-
plicit assumptions of the model of fiscal federalism, since the problem is 
not about revealing differences in preferences between jurisdictions, but 
to satisfy universal and basic needs, which are well known. Furthermore, 
the model assumes that taxpayers of each jurisdiction will express their 
preferences through their votes, whereas local elections are usually de-
cided on the basis of personal, political party or tribal loyalties, and say 
little about local preferences. Locally elected members, especially may-
ors, may not be able to fulfil locally-expressed preferences because of a 
gross mismatch between available resources and promised expenditures. 
Officials often lack incentives to keep their promises.
Prud’homme (2005: 209) also points out that ‘the standard de-
centralization model says nothing or next to nothing about production 
efficiency’. Central bureaucracies are more likely than localised ones to 
operate closer to the ‘technical production frontier’, linked to the fact 
that they are more likely to attract a more qualified workforce. They 
offer better careers, including having greater diversity of tasks and more 
possibilities of promotion, and are better able to invest in research and 
development, technology and innovation (Prud’homme 2005: 209).
Decentralisation and corruption
There is a debate in the literature as to whether the implementa-
tion of inter-regional competition through decentralisation can serve as 
a means to tackle one of the most serious obstacles to economic devel-
opment in particularly the emerging economies, namely corruption and 
proliferation of the ‘shadow economy’ (Prud’homme 2005; Lessman 
and Markwardt 2010: 631; Goel and Saunoris 2014). Some argue that 
competition for mobile capital between jurisdictions strengthens the ac-
countability of bureaucrats and thus puts pressure on rent extraction; 
others point out that local politicians and bureaucrats are more likely to 
be subject to the pressing demands of local interest groups, have more 
discretionary power, and are likely to increase the supply of services 
for which kickbacks are higher, not necessarily which are locally need-
ed, leading to greater levels of corruption (see Lessman and Mrkwardt 
2010: Prud’homme 2005). There are thus conflicting views as to wheth-
er the implementation of inter-regional competition through decentrali-
sation can serve as a means to curtail corruption and proliferation of the 
shadow economy.
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The empirical basis for decentralisation 
Much work remains to be done on the potential direct effect of 
fiscal decentralization on economic growth and the hypothesized 
indirect effects of decentralization on growth through macroeco-
nomic stability, economic efficiency, and the distribution of re-
sources.
(Martinez Vazquez and McNab 2003: 1608)
There is a large and growing body of literature that seeks to pro-
vide an empirical basis for the theory of fiscal federalism and the decen-
tralisation it promotes. Does it result in improved public service delivery 
or is it inefficient due to issues such as multiple intergovernmental trans-
fers? Does it limit or increase the size of the public sector? Does it in-
duce or control corruption? These are some of the many questions that 
have been addressed in the research literature. The evidence from the 
literature is equivocal and conflicting (White 2011). Decentralisation is 
defined and therefore measured in different ways, and this contributes 
to inconsistencies in the outcomes of research studies (Sharma 2006: 53; 
55). Problems with the measurement of decentralisation include that it 
involves the quantification of power and the distribution of power, both 
of which are complex phenomena and not easily amenable to measur-
able categories (Pina-Sanchez 2014: 12). 
The implications of decentralised governance structures are mul-
tidimensional. They do not only have fiscal influences, but also affect 
economic development, social equity and environmental planning pro-
cesses and outcomes in complex ways. Many studies tend to look at 
these dimensions in isolation (Kim and Jurey 2013: 120-121). These 
researchers also note that many studies have found no statistically signif-
icant evidence for the hypothesis that more decentralised governance is 
favourable to fiscal efficiency. The advantages of decentralisation and in-
ter-jurisdictional competition do not necessarily outweigh disadvantages 
such as administrative inefficiency and regulatory inconsistency Several 
studies have also found that environmental planning and resource man-
agement outcomes can be worse in decentralised governance settings 
(Kim and Jurey 2013: 120-121).
The potential impact of decentralisation on economic growth 
is one of the arguments for countries to pursue fiscal decentralisation 
policies and this argument has gained in significance in recent years. 
Questions over whether decentralisation affects economic growth ‘have 
become an important policy issue for developing and transitional coun-
tries’ (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003: 1608). These researchers 
find that the empirical evidence is mixed, further complicated by ‘sever-
al potential problems with the methodological approaches followed to 
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derive those tests’ (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003: 1608). While 
studies have failed to establish a direct link between fiscal decentralisa-
tion and growth, they do illuminate the potential of indirect effects on 
enhanced consumer or allocative efficiency, which in turn can lead to 
flow-on effects that contribute to economic growth, such as increased 
private investment; distribution of resources; and impacts on corruption 
and the ‘capture of local governments’. 
Based on a review of studies up to the early 2000s that have test-
ed for the effects of decentralisation on economic growth indicators, 
these researchers point to the paucity of research either on the indi-
rect effects of decentralisation, on whether decentralisation improves 
efficiency in developing and transitional economies, or on whether it 
induces or controls corruption, leading them to summarise that ‘we are 
uncertain as to the specific and aggregate effects of decentralization on 
growth, equity and macroeconomic stability’ (Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2003: 1609). 
Debates on fiscal decentralisation and its impact on public spend-
ing have been prominent in the literature since the 1970s, and there 
are three competing hypotheses with regard to this relationship, namely 
that decentralisation is negatively associated, that it is not systematical-
ly associated, and that it is positively associated with increased public 
spending (Busemeyer 2008: 451-452). Based on a study that uses panel 
data estimation techniques on a sample of 28 countries for the period 
from 1976 to 2000, Ashworth, Galli and Padovano (2013) find that the 
amount of revenue raised by sub-national governments leads to a long-
term fall in the size of government; that grants between different levels 
of government lead to growth in the size of the public sector; that hav-
ing a parliamentary as opposed to a presidential system of government 
leads to a rise in the size of government, although these influences do 
not work immediately; and that greater decentralisation of expenditure 
leads to greater overall spending (Ashworth et al 2013). 
Based on an analysis of studies carried out on decentralisation in 
64 countries, Lessman and Markwadt (2010) find that decentralisation 
counteracts corruption in countries with high degrees of freedom of the 
press, whereas the tendency in countries without a free press is for the 
positive effects of decentralisation to be outweighed by negative effects, 
with increasing corruption as a result. The implication is that decentral-
isation is a suitable instrument for controlling corruption in countries 
with an appropriate information infrastructure, while countries without 
these necessary information flows may not benefit from decentralization 
(Lessman and Markwadt 2010: 633). 
Ebinger, Grohs and Reiter (2011) evaluated the impact of differ-
ing decentralisation strategies on the administrative performance of lo-
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cal governments subsequent to reform, focusing on six reform ventures 
carried out between 2006 and 2009 in France, Germany and England. 
The study found that direct relations between decentralisation strategies 
and performance effects on certain dimensions are not warranted, call-
ing into question the effects of certain decentralisation strategies (Ebin-
ger et al 2011: 572). Based on a study of 66 countries, Treisman (2006) 
finds that economic development increases decentralisation of expendi-
tures more than revenue decentralisation ‘rendering local governments 
in richer countries more dependent on central transfers’ (Treisman 
2006: 289).
Research conducted in Australia finds that fiscal decentralisation 
tends to enhance microeconomic stability, to increase the size of the 
Australian public sector and, on some but not all measures, to increase 
the inequity of income distribution across the States and to retard eco-
nomic growth (Bodman, Campbell, Heaton and Hodge 2009: 33-34). 
On the basis of the study, the researchers conclude that ‘now that some 
of these effects have been empirically identified the next step is a better 
theoretical understanding of why these relationships exist and what pol-
icy lessons can be learned from them’ (Bodman et al 2009: 34). This is 
in keeping with calls from other researchers, whose work is reviewed in 
this paper, that the empirical foundation for fiscal decentralisation needs 
to be strengthened. 
Decentralisation in the context of emerging economies
Decentralization has become a byword associated with Public 
Sector Reform in developing and transitional countries…Yet de-
spite its emergence as an ubiquitous term that cuts across disci-
plinary lines in international development, the nature, practice, 
and benefits of decentralization remain unclear.
(Rees and Hossain 2010: 581)
Key themes
A strong, interventionist central state was considered by early de-
velopment economics as necessary to correct  market failures and to 
ensure growth, stability and social development in emerging economies 
(Mohan and Stokke 2000). During the 1970s and 1980s, and in contrast 
to this early theory, there was increased support for decentralisation in 
theory and in practice, and many countries began with decentralising 
reforms (Rondinelli and Nellis 1986: 3).
The result is that there has been a profound re-examination of 
the public sector in emerging economies that has led to a shift from the 
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emphasis on development strategies based on centralised modes of plan-
ning and resource allocation, to viewing local government as being more 
efficient in providing public goods and services according the tastes and 
preferences of individual residents (Chattopadhay 2013: 422). Pro-
grams were rolled out across countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
and decentralisation became ‘one of the broadest movements and most 
debated policy issues, in the world of development’ (Faguet, cited in 
Rees and Hossain, 2010: 582).
In keeping with the theories presented above, arguments in fa-
vour of decentralisation for emerging and transitional economies have 
consistently been put forward as, amongst others: 
•	 cutting red tape and waste associated with highly centralised, 
hierarchical public sector bureaucracies; 
•	 tailoring of services to the requirements and preferences of lo-
cal people; 
•	 harnessing local diversity to foster innovation; 
•	 increasing effective democratisation; and 
•	 using local labour to provide local services more cheaply and 
effectively.
(Vries, cited in Rees and Hossain 2010: 584)
In addition, support for decentralisation in the emerging and 
transitional economies has come from a range of seemingly opposed 
theoretical stances. Neoliberals (the ‘new Right’) argued that the state 
was a barrier rather than a driving force in the development process. 
Proponents argued not only for a smaller, de-centralised state, but also 
for including identified and targeted non-governmental groups in the 
development process. The view was promoted that ‘power resides with 
individual members of a community and can increase with the successful 
pursuit of individual and collective goals’ (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 
249).
Radical development studies (the ‘new Left’) questioned the cen-
trality of class as the locus of political consciousness and argued for ‘the 
collective mobilisation of marginalised groups against the disempow-
ering activities of both the state and the market’ (Mohan and Stokke 
2000: 249). Various strands of populism emphasised the role of social 
movements and community organisations, while more radical versions 
were rooted in attacks upon Westernisation and capitalism. In both cases 
the position was that the ‘post-development era is to be founded upon 
localised, non-capitalist practices’ (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 249).
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While the outcome has been a ‘paradoxical consensus’ that val-
ues the role of decentralisation and local participation in enhancing de-
velopment, there has often been a shortage of critical analysis of the 
political use of ‘the local’, local inequalities and power relations. There 
has also been neglect of the role of national and transnational economic 
and political forces (Mohan and Stokke 2000: 247). Rees and Hossain 
(2010: 582) caution that an emphasis on the process of decentralisation 
often seeks to hide the fact that the ultimate goal is political: it is about 
achieving an end state that has ‘potential to fulfil the various organiza-
tional, societal, and ultimately the political objectives of, for example, 
the revolutionary left, or the reformist right’. 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003: 1597) assert that, due to 
confusion over terminology, decentralisation in many countries may 
be no more than geographical deconcentration of central government 
bureaucracy and service delivery, so that ‘decentralisation may actually 
appear to be more popular among developing and transitional countries 
than it truly is’.
Researchers such as Rondinelli et al (1989), Guess (2005) and 
Hankla and Downs (2010) have discussed the issues relating to imple-
menting decentralisation programs in emerging economies. The link be-
tween economic development and decentralisation has been made by 
several authors and the trend is assumed to be strong – the more eco-
nomically developed the country, the more fiscally decentralised it tends 
be (see Treisman 2006: 295). Factors that come into play here include 
that decentralisation itself may be a ‘superior good’ in that, as people 
become wealthier, more educated and more urbanised, they may have 
more time and greater motivation to participate in local affairs, in addi-
tion to being more skilled at organising (Tanzi, cited in Treisman 2006: 
295). Higher levels of development may induce a shift in tastes towards 
public goods and services that can be provided locally with greater levels 
of efficiency.
The degree of decision-making centralisation in a federation is 
also likely to vary with the centralisation of the main parties or party. 
What may be more difficult to measure is whether fiscal decentralisa-
tion is more common in countries moving toward greater democracy 
(Treisman 2006: 313). According to Hankla and Downs (2010: 761), 
‘researchers largely agree that local democratic elections are necessary 
to realise the benefits of decentralisation’. Administrative decentralisa-
tion on its own does not improve service delivery or reduce corruption. 
Electoral competitiveness threatens dishonest or incompetent officials 
with removal and tends to improve fiscal responsibility and governance 
quality (Hankla and Downs 2010: 761-762). Scholars agree that when 
elected local governments are empowered, ‘strong executive authority 
should be coupled with effective local council oversight’ (Hankla and 
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Downs 2010: 778). Drawing on case studies of Pakistan, the Philippines 
and Indonesia, Guess (2005) highlights the need for top-level regime 
support, which should exist in three forms: the authorisation of legal 
and regulatory frameworks; the provision of adequate local financing; 
and the authorisation of oversight and control structures over ‘tenden-
cies to interfere and control’ (Guess 2005: 221).
Commitment and support is needed from national leaders, cen-
tral government agencies and ministries and within the broader polity 
(Rondinelli et al 1989: 77). Amongst others, this implies that political 
leaders need to accept that participation in planning and management 
should be out of the direct control of central government or the domi-
nant political party; that line agencies of the central bureaucracy need to 
have strong administrative and technical capacity to support their field 
agencies and the lower levels of government in performing decentralised 
functions; and that effective channels of political participation and rep-
resentation would need to be developed, including allowing citizens to 
express their needs and demands (Rondinelli et al 1989: 77).
In a paper focusing on transforming the public sector in Indone-
sia, Horhoruw, Karippacheril, Sutiyono and Thomas (2012) point to re-
search which suggests that high performance of government institutions 
can be linked to key drivers of performance that can be grouped into 
three pillars:
•	 Internal effectiveness, which is driven by the quality of the hu-
man capital in the institution, how the human capital is struc-
tured and motivated and the resources deployed to support the 
human capital;
•	 Alignment, which is driven by the quality of leadership, robust-
ness of strategy and how leadership and strategy are translated 
into the overall culture of the institution, driving its people to 
higher performance; and
•	 External impact, driven by the way in which the institution en-
gages with its main stakeholders, including citizens, other gov-
ernment institutions and suppliers and collaborators.
In considering the dynamic process of decentralisation, the con-
cept of ‘technical design and sequencing’ refers to the many processes 
that are required to creating new institutions and building on existing 
practices (Guess 2005: 223).  Guess (2005: 221) suggests that the most 
immediate issue is ‘whether the newly empowered tier of local govern-
ment can absorb its new revenue-raising and expenditure assignments’. 
This is promoted through mechanisms such as transferring of tasks, skills 
and systems from higher-tier to local governments; shifting reporting 
and control system to local accountability; and dealing with resistance to 
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decentralisation, especially concerns about trust and capacity problems.
Focus needs to be placed on the ‘behavioural and psychological 
conditions’ supporting decentralisation (Rondinelli et al 1989: 78) as 
well as on the culture of political institutions (Guess 2005: 221-222). 
These include distrust of government, the strength and nature of family 
and tribal loyalties, and traditions of having arbitrary power over un-
derlings. ‘Culture may be turned from a static obstacle to the dynamic 
foundation on which a decentralization program can be built’ (Guess 
2005: 222). Amongst the cultural factors are those relating to ethnic 
heterogeneity, and perhaps more importantly, the degree to which eth-
nic divisions are politicised and ethnic groups territorially compact. Fol-
lowing the basic fiscal decentralisation argument, and since tastes for 
public goods and services are likely to vary across ethnic groups, there 
are arguments by some that more utility will result if services are in-
deed provided in different, ethnically homogenous regions. As Treisman 
(2006: 293) cautions, this may not always be borne out in practice, since 
it assumes that central governments can only provide goods uniformly.
Since ‘most countries of the world were colonised within the last 
two centuries by one or other of the major powers’ (Treisman 2006: 
294), it is important to consider the legacy of colonial history. Research 
suggests that former colonies of Britain, France and Russia – as well as 
countries never colonised in the modern era – are significantly more de-
centralised than former Spanish or Portuguese colonies (Treisman 2006: 
309-311).
Moving beyond the decentralisation-centralisation dichotomy
It is evident that there is debate as to whether decentralisation 
is good for emerging economies or, at least, whether the ‘benefits of 
decentralization for developing countries outweigh the potential draw-
backs’ (Hankla 2009: 633). Several of the key issues of contention have 
been discussed earlier in this paper. In many transitional and developing 
economies, however, these are not the key issues. As pointed out by 
Prud’homme and Shah (2002: 2-3; emphasis added), in these settings 
‘decentralization is a political must. In most countries, it has been polit-
ically driven’. In other words, it is not a question of whether or whether 
not to decentralise but rather that ‘since decentralization will take place 
anyway, what kind of decentralization is most appropriate?’ 
Recommended considerations are put forward next, drawing on 
the works of key theorists and researchers.
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Consider the design of the system of multi-level governance
Several instruments and policy variables can be used when design-
ing a system of governance involving two or more levels of governments 
(Prud’homme 2002: 3-4). These include the allocation of responsibili-
ties for the provision of public goods and services between the various 
levels of governments; allocation of taxes between the different levels 
of government; central government controls, guidelines and constraints 
upon local government behaviour; and local government election rules.
On the basis of the understanding that the design of a given coun-
try’s system of multi-level governance has an important role to play in 
decentralisation-centralisation decisions, Hooghe and Marks (2003) 
draw on a wide range of literature to distinguish two types of multi-lev-
el governance, namely territorial multi-purpose jurisdictions and spe-
cialised task-focused jurisdictions. While the chief benefit of multi-level 
governance is ‘scale flexibility’, its chief cost lies in the transaction costs 
of coordinating multiple jurisdictions, which is a necessary task since 
the policies adopted in one jurisdiction have spillover effects (negative 
or positive externalities) for other jurisdictions. Consequently, ‘coordi-
nation is necessary to avoid socially perverse outcomes’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2003: 13). In territorial, multi-purpose jurisdictions, a chief 
strategy is to limit the number of autonomous actors who have to be 
coordinated by limiting the number of autonomous jurisdictions. In spe-
cialised, task-specific jurisdictions, coordination costs are best contained 
by constraining interaction across jurisdictions (Hooghe and Marks 
2003: 13-15).
Hankla (2009) provides a conceptual framework for considering 
decentralisation and good governance in the context of emerging econ-
omies. This framework, consisting of three political economy categories 
and nine design principles, puts the focus on ensuring that decentrali-
sation is genuine and effective, on promoting better sub-national repre-
sentation and governance practices and on strengthening national public 
goods and political stability.
Focus on both central and local level capacity
Based on a review of decentralisation and recentralisation in 
health systems, Mosca (2006: 119) concludes that the following capaci-
ty-building principles are essential for the success of reforms:
•	 The decentralising of responsibilities from the centre to the lo-
cal is a long-term project and requires clear guidelines, includ-
ing definition of the roles and functions of different actors.
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•	 A built-in split between the funding function (kept at the centre) 
and the management function (devolved to the local) inevitably 
leads to a form of weak decentralisation and heightens opportu-
nities for a ‘blame game’ between jurisdictions. It should, wher-
ever possible, be avoided at the design stage.
•	 Decentralisation must necessarily be accompanied by devolu-
tion of knowledge and capabilities, which must be present in 
the sub-layers of government.
A study by Chattopadhyay (2013: 438) provides empirical evi-
dence that countries which successfully undertake decentralisation had 
the local level capacity to properly implement the decentralisation pro-
cess or took steps (including investment) to build local capacity. Local 
technical capacity is a key concern and ‘ultimately the success of decen-
tralisation policies hinges on institutional capacity-building’ (Rondinelli 
et al 1989: 78).
Adopt flexibility
Diverse understandings of decentralisation and its contributory 
components suggest the need to adopt flexibility and openness towards 
decentralisation approaches and desired outcomes in any given context. 
Prud’homme (2005: 213) suggests that flexibility should be adopted in 
several areas. There is a strong case for differential treatment of taxes 
and expenditures, for example. Whereas much public expenditure lends 
itself to decentralisation, this is not the case for taxation. It remains in-
evitable therefore that sub-national government will rely to some extent 
on transfers from the central government. The policy focus could shift 
to better design of the system of transfers, which includes accepting the 
need for trade-offs and compromises. Decentralisation should not ig-
nore geography and should take account of the concept of the ‘critical 
mass’ (Prud’homme 2005: 215). 
The size of both the population and the country matters – de-
centralisation is more likely to be warranted in heavily populated as 
well as larger countries. Large cities should be treated differently from 
smaller jurisdictions in that they too are more able to benefit from de-
centralisation. Decentralisation should not shrink central governments 
to below a certain quantitative and qualitative level i.e. the critical mass. 
Consideration could be given to finding out which services or sectors 
lend themselves more readily to decentralisation. The characteristics of 
public goods and services come into play, including the quantity and 
types of external effects and geographical spillovers associated with the 
service; the ease with which the service can be financed by charges as 
opposed to taxes; and the degree of technical and managerial expertise 
required to provide the service (Prud’homme 2005: 215-216). Similar-
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ly, functions may also be treated differently, for example considering 
different degrees of decentralisation for functions such as construction, 
operation and regulation (Prud’homme 2005: 217-218).
Country examples
Indonesia
As of 2012, the population of Indonesia was 244,769,000. On 
the Human Development Index (HDI) scale, Indonesia ranks at 121st 
out of 186 countries, with an HDI score of 0.629 (UNDP 2012). Indo-
nesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a national 
poverty rate of 16.7% (2009 figures) and a rapidly growing share of 
people (30% in 2005) living in urban areas (Rokx, Giles, Satriawan, 
Marzoeki, Harimurti and Yavuz 2010: 25).
Throughout most of its history, Indonesia’s public sector ‘has 
been counted among the most centralized in the world’ (Lewis 2010: 
648). From the late 1990s, the country pursued a relatively dramatic 
shift from the highly centralised state, which reached its apex under the 
‘New Order’ regime of President Suharto (see Rosser 2012: 255), to 
deep decentralisation of most government functions to the district level. 
Under the ‘decentralization principle’, matters referred to lower levels 
of government become the full responsibility of regional governments, 
including authority for policy formulation, planning, implementation 
and funding (Prosojo, Kurniawan and Holidin 2007: 88). Following this 
trajectory, ‘local government reforms have dominated the country’s pol-
icy agenda since 1999’ (The Hunger Project n.d.)1. 
Implementation of the decentralisation and regional autonomy 
law, Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance, which strengthened 
regionalisation, has been described as ‘Big Bang Decentralization’ due 
to the sweeping changes it brought about. When it came into effect in 
2001, it led to the transfer to the regions of authority over most govern-
ment functions except for foreign policy, security and defence, justice, 
monetary, fiscal and macro-economic policies, and religious affairs (Pra-
sojo et al 2007). 
These changes were spurred on following dramatic changes to 
the nation’s economic situation as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, 
and concern over issues of transparency, accountability and profession-
alism in government affairs that led to the introduction of free and fair 
1  The Hunger Project is working in partnership with the UN Democracy Fund on a two-year project 
to cultivate a global community of practice among individuals working to build capacity for effective, 
responsive local governance with a particular focus on impoverished rural areas. The website at 
http://localdemocracy.net/about/ provides an overview of local governance and the decentralisation 
reforms in Indonesia.
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elections and democratic governance in 1999 – ‘given such a situation, 
it became necessary to demonstrate that change in the way local gov-
ernments run their affairs is possible’ (UNDP 2002: 1). Decentralisation 
policies and principles were revised and reformed with the passing of 
the Revised Autonomy Law, Law 32/2004 (Prasojo et al 2007: 86) and 
Law No 12 /2008 (Bandur 2012).
Horhoruw, Karippacheris, Sutiyono and Thomas (2012) char-
acterise the public sector reforms that accompanied these processes of 
decentralisation in three waves, drawing on a model one developed in 
the United Kingdom by Michael Barber in 2007. It includes a post-crisis 
response, which in Indonesia emphasised the role of the overall strategic 
direction, leadership and change management in galvanizing a coalition 
for transformation; consolidating reform, reflected in Indonesia through 
the challenges to defining a culture of performance for the delivery of 
public services; and a shift from devolution and transparency to qua-
si-markets, including the setting of performance indicators and targets 
are being set for the government as a whole and for individual institu-
tions.
The Revised Autonomy Law of 2004 stated that local elections 
were to be conducted by the Commission for District Election. This 
means that the head and the vice head of local governments are elected 
directly by the local citizens. Representatives serve for five years, and 
there is no limitation on re-election (UCLG 2007). Indonesian local gov-
ernment is divided into provincial as well as city/district levels of gov-
ernment. Provinces and city/districts have their own legislative bodies 
and their own government system (United Cities and Local Government 
[UCLG] 2007). The local parliament elects a Governor who heads the 
provincial level of government; city governments are led by a Mayor; 
and district governments are led by a Regent. Regional heads at both the 
provincial and district levels are accountable to the regional legislative 
bodies that elected them, rather than to higher levels of government 
(Kristiansen and Santoso 2006: 251). Mayors and governors are directly 
elected in an open list system (UCLG 2007).
Law 25/1999 requires the central government to transfer at least 
25% of domestic net revenues to sub-national levels of government. Ten 
per cent of this amount is channelled to provincial governments and 
90% to the local governments (Fane 2003: 160). Local governments 
rely mainly on these transfers from the central government and have full 
discretion of their use. It is possible that by-passing the provinces may 
have been linked to fears of secessionist movements, whereas strength-
ening local governments may contribute to weakening those movements 
(Fane 2003: 160).
The central government determines local tax types and rates 
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(UCLG 2010). While the local governments may create new local taxes, 
they are subject to central government approval. The tax on electricity 
sales is the most important own-source revenue, making up about 20% 
of the total; taxes on hotel and restaurant sales comprise about 10% of 
own-source revenues; and public health centre charges also comprise 
about 10% of own-source revenues (UCLG 2010).
With decentralisation, much of the responsibility for service de-
livery was transferred to local governments (UNDP 2002). The most 
important local service in Indonesia is education – local governments 
spend about 35% of their budgets on primary and junior secondary 
school education. This is followed in importance by infrastructure – 
around 15% of local government expenditure is on infrastructure. 
The following challenges are amongst those identified in the liter-
ature as regards the current local governance arrangements in Indonesia:
•	 In a paper examining Indonesia’s process of moving to great-
er devolution of power and transparency since the late 1990s, 
Horhoruw et al (2012: 12) make the comment that, although 
the pace of Indonesia’s reforms is encouraging, it remains slow-
er than the pace of economic and technological change, and has 
been hampered by central controls and regulations that have 
outlived their usefulness.
•	 According to the UCLG (2010: 103), the most critical local 
government issues in Indonesia relate to the distribution of rev-
enues across local governments and to the quantity and quality 
of spending by local governments. The UCLG notes that ‘Indo-
nesian local government’s management capacity is weak, and 
while some municipalities have made significant improvements 
in this domain, across the board this translates into low spend-
ing efficiency’.
•	 Own-source revenues provide another set of constraints. Local 
governments lack access to any good source of own revenue 
that can be used to respond to citizen demand. Tax revenues 
are highly centralised, while expenditure is more decentralised 
– provincial and local government own-source revenues equal 
only about 8% of government revenue (UCLG 2010: 92). A 
2009 Indonesian law mandates that sub-national governments 
will have authority over the urban and rural property tax as part 
of continued decentralisation policies within the next five years, 
‘but implementation during the indicated time frame is far from 
certain… [and]…if it does eventuate, it will be necessary to re-
inforce the capacity of Indonesian local governments to use the 
property tax effectively’ (UCLG 2010: 104).
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•	 Drawing on a 2003 report by the United Nations, The Hunger 
Project (n.d.) notes that decentralisation has created greater lo-
cal independence and a phenomenon of ‘local egos’ that may be 
unproductive when facing problems that require cooperation 
with other regions.
As can be seen above, challenges relating to the fiscal domain 
feature prominently in these commentaries. It also appears that this is 
well recognised at the policy level. According to Lewis (2010: 652), the 
general tendency for line agencies in the Indonesian central government 
to deal with challenges and bottlenecks in the system has been to argue 
that additional funds are needed to improve local public services, and 
these agencies have promoted an increase in intergovernmental funding. 
Recently, however, there has been another tendency, promoted most 
strongly by the Ministry of Finance. This is to reallocate existing inter-
governmental resources (rather than significantly increase new funding 
for subnational governments) and to accompany this with the devel-
opment and use of performance incentives (Lewis 2010: 653). In mid-
2014, ACELG participated in a capacity-building initiative in keeping 
with this very objective.
Lewis (2010: 653-654) suggests that there is a third mechanism, 
namely a ‘civil society’ one: focus on educating citizens about their 
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis local public services, thus increasing 
the expectations that they may have regarding to quality of services to 
which they have access. This approach nevertheless ‘assumes the pri-
or existence of mechanisms through which citizens might channel their 
newly developed aspirations’ (Lewis (2010: 654) or the speeding up 
of initiatives to enhance civil society sector. This would be a long-term 
goal.
On the basis of research into the Indonesian public sector during 
decentralisation reforms, Horhoruw et al (2012: 13) draw the con-
clusion that ‘rapid diffusion of new technologies in the public sector 
could prove a catalyst for much needed performance and governance 
improvements’. Kannan and Morris (2014) similarly point to the im-
portance of infrastructure, including transport, energy and information 
and communication infrastructure, in contributing to challenges in the 
implementation of decentralisation. The World Economic Forum ‘Glob-
al Competitiveness Index’ of 2011 highlighted Indonesia’s inadequate 
supply of infrastructure as the major problem now facing the country, 
for example through the waste of human capital in unnecessary travel 
time and road accidents (Kannan and Morris 2014: 1-2).
These researchers recommend the strengthening of the Policy 
Committee for the Acceleration of Infrastructure Provision (KKPPI), 
which has had ‘limited output’ during the 2006 to 2011 period (Kan-
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nan and Morris 2014: 3). Amongst other, KKPPI could play a key role 
in capacity building for regional government, relocating central experts 
to lead regional government’s infrastructure team and providing out-
sourcing options for regional government. This could lead to the es-
tablishment of province-wide infrastructure maintenance programs that 
regional governments can opt into so that they don’t need to manage 
their own program (Kannan and Morris 2014: 11).
Pakistan
Since the establishment of the country in 1947, Pakistan has had 
local governments as the lowest-tier political structure, but ‘the alternat-
ing pattern of political and military governments has not only affected 
the structure and design of local government systems, but more impor-
tantly had significant implications for the development of grassroots de-
mocracy’ (Alam 2013: 44).
According to Sivaramakishnan (2000, cited in Alam 2013: 45), 
local government in South Asia often tends to be stronger during eras of 
authoritarian rule than in times of democratic rule. During democrat-
ic regimes, elected local government may be less attractive to those in 
power since it provides ‘an additional platform for citizen participation, 
and hence may to some degree rival the centre’. The patronage of local 
governments under military regimes is not unique to Pakistan. In many 
countries military governments have attempted to create grassroots pop-
ularity and support, and to secure their legitimacy and a better external 
(and internal) image by nurturing local governments (Alam 2013: 45).
Following a coup in 1999, General Musharraf introduced a pro-
gram of devolution of power and authority under the aegis of the new-
ly-established National Reconstruction Bureau (Alam 2013: 49). The 
Devolution of Power Plan that ensued was explicitly based on the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, with clear responsibilities for three tiers of sub-na-
tional government:
•	 District governments were given responsibility for functions 
such as agriculture, health and education and became financial-
ly able through transferred funds and local taxes.
•	 Town governments were assigned most of the functions of for-
mer municipal authorities as the main providers of essential ser-
vices such as water, roads and waste disposal.
•	 Union councils were to provide monitoring and oversight of 
service delivery, as well as undertaking small developmental 
projects.
(Alam 2013: 49)
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The 18th Constitutional Amendment was passed on 20th April 
2010, introducing profound changes to Pakistan’s institutions of inter-
governmental coordination (Shah 2012: 393). The most significant of 
these changes is the reassertion of two institutions of the federation, 
namely the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and the National Eco-
nomic Council. The CCI is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes 
four provincial Chief Ministers and three federal government nomi-
nees as members. It has a permanent secretariat and is required to meet 
at least once every quarter (Shah 2012). The CCI has been entrusted 
with decision making, monitoring, supervision and control responsibil-
ities over a wide range of areas, including railways, industrial policy, 
electricity, major ports and federal regulatory authorities. The Nation-
al Economic Council has always been ‘active’ as a constitutional body 
with oversight responsibility for national economic policies. The 18th 
Amendment has tilted the balance of power on the Council in favour 
of the provinces by mandating two members each, including the Chief 
Ministers of each province, and four federal members appointed by the 
Prime Minister (Shah 2012).
The 18th Amendment has deleted the list of federal/provincial 
concurrent responsibilities and reassigned selective functions to the fed-
eration to be guided by the CCI, while devolving others to the provinc-
es. The 18th Amendment ensures that almost all direct public services 
become a provincial responsibility. As a consequence, 17 central gov-
ernment ministries have been devolved to the provinces, key amongst 
which are education, health, labour and human resources and popula-
tion welfare (Hashmi 2014: 52). As Shah (2012: 403) notes, ‘[F]or all 
economic and social services, the provinces will assume a dominant role 
in policymaking and service delivery. For the average citizen, the gov-
ernment that will then matter is the provincial government’.
The Amendment has constrained the federal government in terms 
of its authority over banking, finance, and insurance. Its regulatory au-
thority no longer extends to provincially-owned entities or private enti-
ties operating in a single province. In addition, it has expanded provin-
cial borrowing privileges to include domestic and foreign loans – subject 
to limits and conditions imposed by the National Economic Council 
– and expanded the provinces’ tax domain to include a sales tax on ser-
vices (which could yield revenues equivalent to 0.5–1% of GDP) (Shah 
2012: 400-401)
In a study of five ‘fragile countries’, Anten et al (2012, cited in 
Alam 2013: 54) conclude that Pakistan offers the most detailed exam-
ple of a process of decentralisation that has only partially achieved its 
objectives. Institutional reforms that do not ‘align with the interests and 
incentives of power-holders’ are unlikely to lead to robust new arrange-
ments. Civilian governments have tended to be ‘shy of nurturing grass-
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roots democracy’, raising significant questions about their democratic 
values and commitment to empowering citizens (Alam 2013: 56). 
Local governments are often managed by non-elected administra-
tors and local government elections are often postponed (Alam 2013). 
Linked to changes brought about by the 18th Amendment (discussed 
next), the Ministry of Local Government at the federal level has been 
abolished. 
The following critiques of the changes to the Constitution are 
by Anwar Shah, writing in 2012 in The Lahore Journal of Economics. 
According to this academic, the 18th Amendment neglects the role of 
local governments in public service delivery (Shah 2012). At the same 
time, functions that should be core to a federal government – such as a 
harmonised tax system, protecting minorities and disadvantaged groups, 
and dealing with natural disasters – have been taken from the federal 
domain. It has empowered provinces to borrow from domestic and in-
ternational sources, subject to conditions imposed by the National Eco-
nomic Council. However, the Council may not be able to discipline such 
borrowing.
The changes have strengthened opportunities for tax evasion 
by enabling ‘tax arbitrage’ by potential taxpayers, who can now shift 
their income to agriculture and business expenses from higher-taxed 
sectors or sources of income. The Amendment has opened up the po-
tential for barriers to goods mobility across the county by recognising 
provincial authority to discriminate against non-residents. Article 27(2) 
of the amendment overrides the safeguard against discrimination in em-
ployment by empowering provinces and local governments to institute 
a three-year local residency requirement. ‘This poses a serious risk to 
economic union in Pakistan’ (Shah 2012: 408).
According to Shah (2012), potential consequences include the 
following:
•	 In the absence of fundamental reforms in the governance of 
political parties, political finance, land reforms, and devolution 
to the local levels, provincial empowerment may not necessar-
ily lead to greater participation and accountability, while cor-
ruption and abuse of power may continue unabated. There is 
significant potential for federal–provincial and inter-provincial 
conflict.
•	 The international trend is for globalisation to empower su-
pra-national regimes and local governments at the expense of 
national and provincial governments. Under the changes in Pa-
kistan, empowered provinces could create incentives for weaker 
and numerous local governments and block the rationalisation 
34 Occasional Paper Series Number 15
of local government functions. 
•	 There is strong potential for a ‘tragedy of the commons’ situ-
ation, in which all federating units out-compete each other in 
wasteful spending and giveaways in taxes and subsidies. The 
provinces might create barriers to trade and factor mobility, 
thereby fragmenting the internal common market.
•	 Greater duplication of government structures and processes at 
central and provincial levels are likely to lead to increased costs 
for the Exchequer, higher transaction costs for citizens, and 
‘overgrazing’ by politicians and bureaucrats.
•	 Having decision-making far removed from the people implies 
that provincial governments have incomplete contracts with 
their citizens and cannot be held to account by the latter.
(Shah 2012: 410-419)
Towards a synthesis-framework
There has been a growing acceptance that it is not a question of 
whether decentralisation will or will not take place in a given country, 
but rather to move beyond the centralisation-decentralisation dichot-
omy, consider what kind of decentralisation is most appropriate and 
strive to maximise the benefits of decentralisation for the citizens of the 
country. In order to contribute to this quest, the following framework 
is put forward. The elements of the framework are based on the works 
of theorists and researchers that have been introduced in earlier sections 
of this paper.
Appreciate the theoretical scope of fiscal decentralisation
There is value in having a sounder appreciation of the theoretical 
and historical development of the concept of fiscal decentralisation, in-
cluding the debates that have been generated over many decades.
On the basis of an exploration of the concept of decentralisation 
and the arguments in favour of it that have been put forward in the lit-
erature over many decades, the following understanding of the promise 
of fiscal decentralisation is put forward:
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Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, decentralisation is both 
a structure and a dynamic process that relates to questions of au-
thority, responsibility and power, as well as to the functions and 
resources, of different levels of government. Arguments in favour of 
decentralisation focus on the role it has in making government more 
efficient in the supply of local public goods and more responsive and 
accountable to the citizenry. Both are presumed to enhance the le-
gitimacy of government authority through promoting the welfare of 
individuals and communities. Decentralisation allows for more ef-
fective and inclusive decision-making, reduces the distance between 
bureaucrats and economic agents, and may also be able to enhance 
economic growth.
Source: author, based on synthesis of literature
There is a large and growing body of literature that seeks to pro-
vide an empirical basis for the theory of fiscal decentralisation. The ev-
idence from the literature is equivocal and conflicting. Many studies 
have found no statistically significant evidence for the hypothesis that 
more decentralised governance is favourable to fiscal efficiency. The ad-
vantages of decentralisation and inter-jurisdictional competition do not 
necessarily outweigh disadvantages such as administrative inefficiency 
and regulatory inconsistency. 
The principle of subsidiarity has been incorporated into the the-
ory and practice of decentralisation, and is regarded as a key normative 
principle for federations and supranational bodies. On the basis of an 
exploration of the principle in the literature, the following understand-
ing is put forward:
The principle of subsidiarity, which was developed in Catholic so-
cial theory in the mid-20th century, has become incorporated into 
the political, economic and public administration understandings of 
decentralisation, particularly as it applies to federations and to su-
pranational entities. It draws attention to (central) government, the 
individual, and the mediating structures which are bulwarks against 
government authority. The principle argues that taxing, spending 
and regulatory functions should be exercised by lower levels of gov-
ernment unless a convincing case can be made, by central govern-
ment, for assigning them to itself. Arguments for retaining powers 
need to be made on the basis of comparative efficiency.
Source: author, based on synthesis of literature
Support for decentralisation in the emerging and transitional 
economies has come from a range of seemingly opposed theoretical 
stances, but decentralisation reforms tend to be essentially politically 
36 Occasional Paper Series Number 15
– not economically or empirically – driven. What some governments 
describe as decentralisation may be no more than geographical decon-
centration of central government bureaucracy and service delivery.
The positive associations of decentralisation are countered by ar-
guments that it can lead to increases in disparities and inequality and 
can have negative consequences on macroeconomic stability. Far from 
enhancing government efficiency, there is the perspective that decen-
tralisation can undermine efficiency, particularly in emerging econo-
mies. There are conflicting views as to whether the implementation of 
inter-regional competition through decentralisation can serve as a means 
to tackle one of the most serious obstacles to economic development in 
particularly the emerging economies, namely corruption and prolifera-
tion of the shadow economy.
The literature suggests benefit in considering four interlinked di-
mensions of the concept – fiscal, political, administrative and market, 
with fiscal as the central indicator. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Dimensions of fiscal decentralisation
Source: author, based on strong correspondence in literature
The dimensions of fiscal decentralisation are dynamic and inter-
connected.
The theory highlights that administrative decentralisation can be 
placed on a continuum of administrative autonomy from deconcentra-
tion – delegation – devolution.
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The subsidiarity principle has utility as a normative instrument in 
the process of establishing a broad, shared intergovernmental political 
framework.
The divestment, deregulation and dispersed power implications 
of market decentralisation are important in the age of globalisation and 
governance networks.
The potential benefits and potential drawbacks of decentralisa-
tion are well formulated in the literature, and international research 
from a wide range of disciplines is vigorous and ongoing.
Focus on the country and its goals
Attention can be given to the economic, political, organisation-
al, and cultural and historical factors in the quest to build up a sound 
appreciation of the country at the time of reforms to the public sector.
It is valuable to aim for some level of shared agreement as to 
why decentralisation is being pursued in the given country and what it 
is intended to achieve at this time. If the decision is essentially political, 
consideration could be given to enriching this with insights from politi-
cal economic theory and empirical research.
Focus could be given to considering what kind of decentralisation 
is most appropriate for the country, given its historical, geographical, 
political, cultural and socio-economic context. There is a range of mod-
els in the literature that can be drawn upon. Engagement with the citi-
zens and internal and external experts is beneficial in this decision-mak-
ing process. 
Consider the design of the system of multi-level governance
Drawing upon a critical appreciation of fiscal decentralisation 
theory and of the country and its goals, an inventory can be made of the 
instruments and policy variables available. These include:
•	 the allocation of responsibilities for the provision of public 
goods and services amongst tiers of government; 
•	 allocation of taxes between the different levels of government;
•	 central government controls, guidelines and constraints upon 
local government behaviour; and 
•	 local government election rules.
38 Occasional Paper Series Number 15
Decentralisation design principles for good governance are illustrated 
in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Decentralisation design principles for good governance
Source: adapted from Hankla (2009)
These design principles are based on past research on the gov-
ernance implications of devolving power to sub-national authorities 
and by drawing lessons from theory and experience for designing bet-
ter decentralised institutions (Hankla 2009: 646). Practical lessons can 
be derived from them about structuring intergovernmental relations for 
policy-makers in emerging economies.
In addition to territorial multi-purpose jurisdictions, including 
municipalities, there are models of regional shared services that could 
be beneficial for a range of public services including libraries and water 
catchment authorities.
Focus on both central and local capacity
Decentralisation is accompanied by devolution of knowledge and 
capabilities, which need to be present in the sub-layers of government. 
Capacity-building mechanisms include a phased transferral of tasks, 
skills and systems from higher-tier to local governments; gradual shift-
ing of the reporting and control system to local accountability; and deal-
ing with resistance to decentralisation, especially local concerns about 
trust and capacity problems. 
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High levels of performance in government institutions can be 
linked to key drivers of performance. A framework of pillars and drivers 
of public sector performance (Figure 4) is based on the work of Horho-
ruw et al (2012) in Indonesia, who themselves based the categorisations 
upon a body of research into public sector performance.


























Figure 4: Pillars and drivers of public sector performance
Source: adapted from Horhoruw et al (2012)
A model for technical design and sequencing, based on Guess 
(2005) is provided in Figure 5. It is illustrated in this framework as part 
of the focus on building and sustaining institutional capacity, but at the 
same time is linked to the design of the system of multi-level gover-
nance, discussed above.
Figure 5: Technical design and sequencing
Source: adapted from Guess (2005: 223-225)




Figure 5: Technical design and sequencing 
Source: adapted from Guess (2005: 223-225) 
Within this framework, relative macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite, and the other elements 
should not necessarily be viewed in a linear fashion. A holistic approach is ideal. 
Adopt flexibility, supported by feedback mechanisms, in the process of decentralisation 
Feedback mechanisms include research, and the monitoring and reporting framework and 
facilitation networks set up within the design of the system (as discussed above). 
Attention could be paid to the synchronicity of the various dimensions of decentralisation – fiscal, 
administrative, political and market – and taking steps to improve alignment when a lack of 
synchronicity threatens the stability of the reform process and of the evolving system. 
Consideration could be given to differential treatment of taxes and expenditures. Certain services or 
sectors may lend themselves more readily to decentralisation – there are models and quantitative 
methods that can assist with this. There may also be value in treating the functions differently and 
applying mixed decentralisation settings to enhance efficiency. Functions include selecting the 
appropriate investment, construction (contracting and supervision), and operation and regulation.  
Decentralisation should not shrink central governments to below a certain quantitative and qualitative 
level. 
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Within this framework, relative macroeconomic stability is a pre-
requisite, and the other elements should not necessarily be viewed in a 
linear fashion. A holistic approach is ideal.
Adopt flexibility, supported by feedback mechanisms, in the pro-
cess of decentralisation
Feedback mechanisms include research, and the monitoring and 
reporting framework and facilitation networks set up within the design 
of the system (as discussed above).
Attention could be paid to the synchronicity of the various di-
mensions of decentralisation – fiscal, administrative, political and mar-
ket – and taking steps to improve alignment when a lack of synchronicity 
threatens the stability of the reform process and of the evolving system.
Consideration could be given to differential treatment of taxes 
and expenditures. Certain services or sectors may lend themselves more 
readily to decentralisation – there are models and quantitative methods 
that can assist with this. There may also be value in treating the func-
tions differently and applying mixed decentralisation settings to enhance 
efficiency. Functions include selecting the appropriate investment, con-
struction (contracting and supervision), and operation and regulation. 
Decentralisation should not shrink central governments to below 
a certain quantitative and qualitative level.
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